
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
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THE MADIUN AFFAIR: HATTA'S BETRAYAL OF INDONESIA'S FIRST SOCIAL REVOLUTION

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PREFACE

This study was originally presented as an MA Thesis in Non-Western Sociology at the University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands, in 1979.

A good deal of the material used in the study has been collected at the *Algemene Rijksarchief* (State Archives) in The Hague, particularly the documents by the former Netherlands Indies Administration in Batavia, now Jakarta. These documents were made accessible to the general public only a couple of years ago.

Other information has been provided by Siauw Giok Tjan and Moorianto who were so kind to allow me to put questions about events described and analyzed in the study.

I feel much indebted to my supervisor, Frans Hüskens, to Professor Ernst Utrecht, who helped me with the English version, and to Bob Hering, who made publication of this English version possible.*

Rudi Kreutzer

* The Dutch version has been published in *Tijdschrift voor Diplomatie*, Brussels, June 1980.

This study is not more than a limited attempt to give an alternative, but brief outline of the prelude to the so-called "Madiun Affair" of 1948. The main point is that use has been made of some new material and sources which have not been considered in previous publications.

The outline has been based on the following *decisive* events:

(i) The downfall of the Amir Sjarifudin Cabinet; the *Front Demokrasi Rakjat* (FDR, Democratic People's Front) going into opposition;

(ii) The rationalization policy of the ensuing Hatta Government;

(iii) The struggle for the National Program;

(iv) The Delanggu strike;

(v) The Suripno affair and the international relations of the Indonesian Republic in those days;

(vi) Musso's return and the FDR's new political course; and

(vii) The events in Solo and Madiun leading to the actual outbreak of the upheaval.

(i) THE DOWNFALL OF THE AMIR SJARIFUDIN CABINET: THE FDR GOING INTO OPPOSITION

One may assume that the Madiun Affair has its origin in the downfall of Amir Sjarifudin's government in January 1948. Amir was then leader of the FDR. The downfall had been provoked by the *Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia* (Masjumi), which at the time enjoyed the support of both Sukarno and Hatta, respectively President and Vice-President of the Republic of Indonesia. Apparently the initiative had been taken on instructions by Dr. Graham, the United States

representative in the newly established Committee of Good Offices. Under the aegis of the United Nations this body had to find a solution to the so-called "Indonesian Question".

In January 1948, an agreement had been reached between the Dutch government and the leaders of the Indonesian Republic, the Renville Agreement, named after the American merchant-ship "Renville", on board which the document was signed. This agreement was not to the Republic's advantage. Strong American pressure had been necessary to force Prime Minister Sjarifudin, who personally had led the Republican Delegation, to bow to the agreement's unfavourable conditions. In his book *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia,* still a standard work on Indonesia's 1945-49 nationalist revolution, George Kahin has stated that:

> Dr. Graham made it clear that unless the terms demanded by the Dutch were accepted by the Republic, the American Government would probably not be inclined to oppose further Dutch attempts to impose a settlement by force (Kahin, 1952, p.228)

Besides threats, Graham promised American support for the ultimate goal of a "sovereign and unitarian Indonesia".

One encounters above-mentioned moves by Dr. Graham in a "highly secret" report by the *Corps Algemene Politie* (General Police Corps) in Batavia (now Jakarta) of April 1, 1948.[1] The report was sent to Dr. van Mook, Lt.-Governor General of the Netherlands Indies. Important additional information has been provided by Siauw Giok Tjan, who was a minister in the Amir Sjarifudin Cabinet and a member of *Partai Sosialis* (Socialist Party). *Partai Sosialis* opposed the Renville Agreement, although Amir Sjarifudin personally did accept the Renville terms. And the Cabinet consisted of a number of political

parties with different political views. Not only the *Sajap Kiri,* the left-wing front of *Partai Sosialis, Partai Komunis Indonesia* (PKI, Communist Party of Indonesia) and *Partai Buruh Indonesia* (PBI, Labor Party of Indonesia) had joined the Cabinet, but also the *Partai National Indonesia* (PNI, National(ist) Party of Indonesia), the *Masjumi*[2] and *Partai Serekat Islam Indonesia* (PSII, Moslem Federation of Indonesia) were members of the coalition. The leaders of PNI and *Masjumi*[3] calculated that their parties would accept Renville. Hence, *Partai Sosialis* was confronted with a difficult problem, because the two biggest coalition partners were prepared to agree with Renville wheras the Prime Minister's party, the *Partai Sosialis,* would certainly reject Renville. That would be an abnormal situation. Then, *Partai Sosialis,* confronted with this abnormal situation, decided to accept Renville as the most possible result.[4] But what happened after that decision was taken? At the opening of the next session of the Cabinet, Amir Sjarifudin had to announce that PNI as well as *Masjumi* had refused to accept Renville and discontinued their support to the Cabinet. Without consulting the members of his own party, Amir Sjarifudin resigned. He felt cheated by the biggest coalition partners.

The "highly secret" police report of April 1, 1948, gives a somewhat different version of the events.

> Sukarno called Amir Sjarifudin after it had become known that *Masjumi* would not accept Amir Sjarifudin's policies. In a rude manner Amir Sjarifudin was told to dissolve the Government because Sukarno wanted another cabinet. Amir Sjarifudin replied that he could not do that without creating a very difficult situation. Moreover he had dedicated all his energy to the Republic who had now entered the most dangerous period in her early years. Then Sukarno decided that he himself should dissolve the (Amir Sjarifudin) Government. The recent shifts in the power game inevitably demanded a new government, but there were

> no obstacles to offer Amir Sjarifudin another post in the new cabinet. In the meantime, units of the Armed Forces and *Masjumi* supporters spontaneously organized protest demonstrations against Amir Sjarifudin. He was called a traitor. On banners carried by the crowd one could read: *Amir berchianat, kami tidak setoedjoe dengan Renville* (Amir has betrayed us, we do not agree with Renville). In the evening, after the demonstrations, Amir Sjarifudin returned his mandate to Sukarno.[5]

Subsequently the mandate (to form a new cabinet) was given to Vice-President Hatta. Hatta was also given the order to establish the new government as soon as possible and, of course, not to include representatives of *Sajap Kiri*. Hatta's program of government was based on two priorities:

(a) the implementation of the Renville Agreement; and

(b) the rationalization of the Indonesian Army.

It was clear that opposition against Renville had been used by *Masjumi* as well as PNI to force *Sajap Kiri* out of government.[6] Hatta did offer *Partai Sosialis* three minor posts in the new Cabinet. But he was determined to leave the PKI and the PBI outside the Cabinet. Amir Sjarifudin was offered the post of Reconstruction and Youth. Abdulmajid, the second *Partai Sosialis* member, was offered the post of Social Welfare and Labor Tjokronegoro, the third *Partai Sosialis* member, could have the post of Food Supply. The *Sajap Kiri*, at the time still a united front, had requested five posts: Setyadjit (PBI) as Minister of Health, Maruto Darusman (PKI) as Minister of Social Welfare and Labor, Abdulmajid (*Partai Sosialis*) as Minister of Home Affairs, Amir Sjarifudin (*Partai Sosialis*) as Minister of Defense, and Tjokronegoro (*Partai Sosialis*) as Minister of Food Supply.[7] According to Kahin, the *Sajap Kiri* had requested four posts, including

the post of defense for Amir Sjarifudin.[8] Hatta stubbornly refused to see Amir Sjarifudin on the defense post, and he also tried to create a split in the leadership of *Sajap Kiri*. That would seriously weaken the position of the left.

Hatta's proposals were rejected by the still united *Sajap Kiri*, and one week later Hatta announced the new Cabinet without *Sajap Kiri* ministers except two *Partai Sosialis* members, Supeno and Kusnan, Ministers of State without ministries or departments. Hatta had included Supeno and Kusnan in the Cabinet at a strong request by Sutan Sjahrir, then a member of *Partai Sosialis*. The leadership of *Partai Sosialis* was furious and considered Sjahrir, Supeno and Kusnan as serious offenders of party solidarity and discipline. They were immediately expelled from *Partai Sosialis*. On February 13, 1948, Sjahrir and his followers established their own party, the *Partai Sosialis Indonesia* (PSI, Socialist Party of Indonesia).

I think it is correct to arrive at the conclusion that Hatta, who had become very anti-communist after his return to Indonesia in the 1930's, had deliberately formulated his offer of participation in such a way that one could easily predict *Partai Sosialis's* rejection of the offer. Already in the beginning of the formation of the new Cabinet, Hatta had done his utmost to exclude the PKI from participation. In his recently published memoirs, former *Masjumi* leader Dr. Abu Hanifah assumes that Hatta in those days was already aware of the "danger" of the growing power and influence of the Indonesian communists.[9]

The Hatta Cabinet was formed by political parties which were prepared to make compromises, and Hatta himself was an ardent advocate

of such a political approach. In fact the opposition against Renville was not a genuine opposition; it was dishonest because its real aim was to promote the downfall of the Amir Sjarifudin Cabinet and to mislead the Indonesian people who at the time had serious doubts about the so-called *diplomasi-politik* (political diplomacy). There is now sufficient evidence which confirms that the new political leaders were trying to get support from the United States and, therefore, willing to play Washington's card.

The "highly secret" police report of April 1, 1948, also states:

> In the meantime secret meetings took place between Graham and Sukarno and between Graham and Sukiman.[10] During these meetings Graham promised that Marshall-Plan aid to Indonesia would be considered as soon as the Republic had accepted Renville and the *Sajap Kiri's* influence on the Indonesian Government had been reduced. This would secretly curb all activities by the left-wing front.[11]

Gradually the *Sajap Kiri* was driven into opposition. In the beginning it tried to get a place in the Government by showing its willingness to co-operate. When the friendly approach did not bring the desired results, the *Sajap Kiri* turned to strong oppositional ways. During a mass meeting on February 26, 1948, the *Sajap Kiri* was reformed into the *Front Demokrasi Rakjat* (FDR, Democratic People's Front). FDR's program, announced during the meeting, put more emphasis on the interests of the workers and peasants, but maintained that Renville should be carried out. Apparently FDR was still trying to gain Hatta's approval!

Some weeks later FDR's program was radically changed. The new program ordered, among others:

1. Rejection of the Renville Agreements;
2. Discontinuation of the negotiations with the Dutch; and
3. Nationalization of all foreign enterprises.

Now the three main differences between the Hatta Government and the FDR: the economic policy, the foreign policy, and the nationalization of the Army, had become more visible. But the acute differences were still kept hidden.

(ii) HATTA'S RATIONALIZATION POLICY

The FDR's political and social influence was based on two powerful pillars:

1. The Army, particularly the so-called *TNI-Masjarakat*, a true people's army;[12] and
2. The labor unions, particularly the *Sentral Organ Buruh Seluruh Indonesia* (SOBSI, All Indonesian Central Labor Organization).

The *TNI-Masjarakat* was created by Amir Sjarifudin. As Minister of Defense he had successfuly placed under one national command all local *laskars* (armed groups) which were spontaneously formed during the first year of the 1945-49 national revolution. Amir wanted to transform the *TNI-Masjarakat* into a true people's army, placed under the control of so-called "political commissars". As Minister of Defense he had also put military commanders with sympathies for the left in important key positions in the Army. Moreover, most *laskars* - except the reactionary armed groups which maintained links with the *Masjumi*, such as the *Hizbullah* - had already from the beginning of their existence connections with the left-wing organizations. Finally, Amir had given to local elements a say in

local military decision-making in order to strengthen the bonds between the Army and the local population. Such a policy would guarantee a successful outcome of the ongoing guerilla war against the Dutch.

But the "Western professionally" educated former KNIL-officers,[13] among others, A.H. Nasution, T.B. Simatupang, Alex E. Kawilarang, Abdulkadir, A.J. Mokoginta, who wanted a smaller but rigidly disciplined army under *their* leadership, did not agree with Amir Sjarifudin's ideas. They belonged to the Indonesian social elite and preferred a well-trained, well-armed and, in particular for them, reliable army. They did not trust the *TNI-Masjarakat* which appeared to them as a more or less leftist bunch of soldiers who probably would side with the masses in a conflict between elite and masses.

From January 1948 onwards a united front developed between the right-wing pro-american politicans under the leadership of Hatta and the *Masjumi* on the one hand and western-oriented professional army officers under the leadership of Simatupang and Nasution on the other. The common aim was the demobilization of irregular *laskars* who "had become more or less under the influence of communist organizations" as well as the purification of the Army from "unreliable" officers.[14] The leading positions in the Army were solely given to professional officers who in the past had followed serious military training. Only the military units commanded by these officers were given a definite legal status. Such an officially recognized army division was the West Java *Siliwangi* Division, which until the end of the 1950's was regarded as the "elite army division" of the Indonesian

Armed Forces. Another military unit which stood "model" for a long time was the *Corps Polisi Militer* (CPM, Military Police Corps).

This defense policy initiated by the Hatta government has become known in Indonesia's history as *rasionalisasi*.[15] According to *rasionalisasi*, the Republic's military power of 400,000 soldiers in the beginning of 1948 had to be reduced to only 57,000 well-trained men, who would form the permanent nucleus of the Army. To this standing armed force of professional soldiers, a corps of conscripts, so-called *milisia* (militias) would be added. The conscripts would be militarily-trained local peasants.[16]

During the official announcement of *rasionalisasi*, the shrewd Hatta was able to conceal the Government's real aims. He presented the program as follows:

> Nobody will be amazed that the State's total revenue do not cover its expenditure. But the gap can be minimized through an effective rationalization, that is, to transfer employment from unproductive to productive sectors of the economy.[17]

By the "unproductive" sector Hatta meant the army, or at least some sections of it.

However, the FDR could quickly unravel the real aims of Hatta's *rasionalisasi*. The FDR leaders felt cheated by Hatta and decided to oppose *rasionalisasi*. Gradually the Hatta Government was confronted with a coalition of FDR and *laskars* who felt threatened by demobilization. Among the military units which began to oppose the Hatta government one should mention Division IV, better known as *Divisi Senopati*. This army division was stationed in Solo and placed under the command of the very popular Colonel Sutarto.

In his study on "The Military aspects of the Madiun Affair",[18] D.C. Anderson gives a detailed analysis of the events in which *Divisi Senopati* was involved. The *Divisi* played a key role in the prelude to the Madiun affair. As a consequence of the May 1948 rationalization regulation, Colonel Sutarto was, quite unexpectedly, dismissed from active army service, and his subordinates and other members were ordered to report to Headquarters of the Army in Yogjakarta. These measures provoked vehement protests from the entire left. On May 20, Solo was the scene of a mass-protest demonstration against the re-organization and rationalization plans of the Government. Sutarto and his soldiers ignored the instructions by the army's Headquarters and carried out their own "reorganization" of Division IV. In June they had transformed Division IV into a "battle-ready" military unit which was given the special name of *Divisi Pertempuran Panembahan Senopati* (Battle-Division Duke Senopati). Sutarto, promoted to Major-General, became the commander of the "reorganized" army division, and he and his soldiers enjoyed firm support of the majority of Solo's population, particularly the numerous followers and supporters of FDR and organizations associated with FDR.

On July 2, 1948, Sutarto was murdered by unknown agents. Until now it has been impossible to make a definite assessment about the identity of the murderers. However, there is some indication that the murder had been ordered by the Army's leadership. Others believe that Sutarto was murdered by the adherents of Tan Malaka's Trotskyist political ideology, *Murbaism*. It was widely known that the *Murbaists* fostered blind hatred for the FDR. Although they, like the FDR, totally rejected Hatta's views, the *Murbaists* staunchly backed all

the Government's moves against the FDR organizations and Division IV. The PKI called the murder a "rationalization with different means"!

In the meantime the Army's leadership continued its close co-operation with the Hatta Government in an effort to realize the rationalization plans. On May 8, 1948, a meeting was held at the *Dewan Siasat Militer* (Council for Military Strategy). Participants were Hatta and the Chiefs of the Armed Forces, in those days: Sudirman,[19] Nasution, Latief (all three representing the Army), Subiakto (Navy), and Suryadarma (Air Force). We find the main points of discussion in a secret document.[20] Two points draw particular attention. First, all participants unanimously agreed that the *TNI-Masjarakat* should be dissolved as soon as possible. Nasution even regarded the *TNI-Masjarakat* in principal already dissolved.

Secondly, Hatta was prepared to allow the Americans to establish military bases within Indonesian territory in exchange for weapons. He said, among others:

> On the other hand, we are convinced that the Dutch, unlike the Americans in the Philippines, are not able to guarantee our security. In case the Americans ask for bases, we should give them what they want, but on the condition that they provide us with weapons.

Hatta's statement shows clearly that the participants to the May 8, 1948 meeting were planning to surrender the still young Indonesian State to US imperialism.

In August 1948, the Army's top leaders held a similar meeting. But this time Army Commander Sudirman was absent.[21] The Army's leadership showed deep concern for the damage the PKI could cause to the negotiations with the Dutch, the internal security, and *rasionalisasi*. Nasution pleaded to use the elitist *Siliwangi* troops

to destroy the influence of the PKI. That was already very close to the outbreak of the Madiun revolt. Let me first have a look at other events also leading to that revolt.

(iii) THE STRUGGLE FOR THE NATIONAL PROGRAM

Pursuing a practical policy, during the first half of 1948 the FDR fought energetically for a generally accepted national program and the formation of a new government that would be prepared to adopt the national program as its political program and implement it. In this way the FDR tried to return in the Government in order to realize changes in the Government's policies. Hence, the FDR wanted to realize its gaols in a *democratic* way!

Unfortunately, Hatta was also Vice-President of the Republic and, consequently, the Hatta Cabinet was a so-called "presidential cabinet", that is, a government which was not responsible to the *Komité Nasional Indonesia Pusat* (KNIP, National Central committee of Indonesia), the provisional Indonesian Parliament. The KNIP was not an elected legislative body, its members were appointed by President Sukarno. (The first Indonesian Election was held in 1955.) However, the FDR wanted a cabinet which should be responsible to a parliament. Hence, the Hatta Cabinet should be transformed into a so-called "parliamentary cabinet". In other words, Hatta should give up his post of Vice-President of the Republic. The FDR leaders also claimed that the three PSI members in the *Badan Pekerdja-Komité Nasional Indonesia Pusat* (BP-KNIP, the KNIP's daily Work Council) should be replaced by members of *Partai Sosialis*, because these three seats were originally assigned to *Partai Sosialis*.

Although the claims were correct, FDR did not succeed to get them realized. More successful was FDR's effort to get a National Program conceived and generally accepted. FDR hoped that such a program would become the work-program of a national cabinet consisting of all political parties. Such a cabinet would certainly include the FDR.

Finally, by the end of July 1948 the National Program was announced. It was accepted by all important political parties, including those that participated in the Hatta Cabinet with the exception of the PNI and the *Masjumi*, however. The National Program was quite radical. It ordered, among others, an important extension of Indonesia's foreign relations, improvement of what was called "the people's defense", the nationalization of vital industries, agrarian reform, and general elections should be held soon.[22]

It was clear that the Program would lead to stagnation in the negotiations with the Dutch. And it would certainly be unacceptable to the United States. The Chairman of the conference which had conceived the National Program, Dr. Tambunan of the *Partai Keristen Indonesia* (Parkindo, Party of Indonesian Christians, particularly Protestants), stated that the Hatta Cabinet had only one alternative: to adopt the Program or resign. Then Hatta demonstrated his extreme shrewdness: on July 27 he announced that the Government had officially accepted the National Program, although "some parts of the Program could not be implemented in the near future." In this way he could avoid a cabinet crisis!

In order "to satisfy" FDR, on August 5 he offered its leaders three posts in the Cabinet - it was called a "small reshuffling"

- namely the posts of labor and health, and the post of Minister of State (without a ministry or department).[23]

Hatta's offer was in fact a provocation. He knew very well beforehand that the FDR would reject the offer because it was in fact an insult to every big political organization like the FDR. As expected, the FDR correctly claimed an equal number of important ministerial posts as those given to the PNI and the *Masjumi*. Hatta's deliberately set aims were clear. He desperately wanted the FDR to be excluded from the Cabinet in order to be able to carry out his original plans and follow the secret instructions by the Americans. Obviously the original plans basically differed from the National Program which was accepted only to mislead the opposition.[24]

On September 9, 1948, when the FDR was already almost totally dominated by the PKI, it suggested co-operation with the PNI as well as the *Masjumi*. As it could easily be expected, the two anti-communist organizations firmly rejected such an idea. Dr. Abu Hanifah adds: "Of course, not that abruptly, and the rejection was couched in more political terms."[25]

In the meantime, the FDR had already started its campaign to implement the National Program, particularly the part that dealt with the proposed agrarian reforms. In some places fights even broke out between FDR supporters and local authorities. These first clashes were clear indications that the Hatta Government was pursuing a political course which was different from the one adopted in the National Program. Moreover, the Hatta Government, too, had officially accepted the National Program as its political program!

(iv) THE DELANGGU STRIKE

The FDR had not only just proposed to establish national unity, it was also deeply involved in all sorts of activities to achieve that end. It organized big protest demonstrations attended by 100,000's of Indonesians who flocked from all sides to the mass meetings to listen to the FDR speakers. The FDR was able to assemble an excellent core of eloquent speakers who in a lucid way explained the important problems. These generally militant activities enormously enhanced the FDR's influence among the ordinary people. And soon it could proudly claim a huge mass following.

Besides, the SOBSI, which was heavily dominated by the communists, organized a number of strikes. In particular the strike by plantation workers at Delanggu in the Solo area was important. The Delanggu Strike was caused by the deterioration of economic conditions at and around Delanggu. These conditions were bad because of the economic blockade by the Dutch as well as the incompetence of the Indonesian Government to eliminate feudalism and put an end to the speculative operations of usurers and black marketeers. The strikes at Delanggu were organized by SABUPRI, the union of communist-oriented plantation workers, which was a member of SOBSI. With its 800,000-1,000,000 members it was in those days Indonesia's biggest labor union. One of SABUPRI's leaders, Parna who now lives as an exile in the Netherlands, has provided me with some information about Delanggu.[26] The main goal of the strike was to force the Hatta Government to effectively increase the wages of the plantation workers accordingly to the minimum wages set by government regulations. Before the strike plantation workers were paid considerably lower wages, usually less

than half of the official minimum wages. The 20,000 jute and cotton workers at and around Delanggu went on strike for approximately 35 days, from the middle of May until the end of June 1948. Finally, all their claims were honoured. But during the strike the workers had to endure all sorts of assults, including armed attacks by *laskars* who supported the Government's policy. Besides, the FDR and the SABUPRI were accused of having endangered the Republic. The FDR and SABUPRI leaders firmly replied that it was the Government that had endangered the Republic as a result of its ineffective and even incorrect economic policies. FDR and SABUPRI regarded the workers and peasants as the most important Indonesian forces in the struggle of independence against the Dutch colonial rulers. In order to mobilize these important forces one should see their interests paramount. "Only workers and peasants who are not suffering from hunger are in the position to effectively fight a struggle." And, finally, FDR and SOBSI only demanded from the Hatta Government the correct implementation of the existing regulations as well as the agrarian reforms. These reforms were part of the National Program which the Hatta Government, too, had accepted.

(v) THE SURIPNO AFFAIR AND THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA

In December 1947, Suripno had received from President Sukarno full powers to establish friendly relations and other agreements with the government of the Soviet Union and other governments in Eastern and Central Europe. In January 1948 Suripno came in touch with the government of the Soviet Union through the Soviet Ambassador in Prague. Both sides agreed in principle to the exchange of Consuls. Then Suripno waited in vain for further instructions. Hatta wanted

to realize the "needed good relations" with the United States and the Netherlands and, therefore, he ignored the results that Suripno had already achieved. Although Hatta had often publicly stated that he wished to pursue a so-called "policy of neutrality" and tried to keep Indonesia out of the Cold War (which had just started), he deliberately avoided any contact with the Soviet Union despite the fact that in those days the Soviet Union had been the only superpower who had consistently supported the Indonesians in the United Nations. Hatta went even so far as to deny that Suripno ever had been given powers to negotiate with the Soviet Union!

Eventually the Soviet Government took the initiative to terminate the deadlock. On May 22, 1948, it informed Suripno that the Consular Treaty had been ratified. The Soviet move totally embarrassed Hatta. He was so confused that he could not find a proper answer at the first instance. On May 30, 1948, he informed the Dutch envoy L. Neher that the Indonesian government had decided "temporarily not to extend its diplomatic relations." Moreover, he admitted that "the news from Prague had embarrassed him" and that he "seriously regretted it"![27] The totally unreliable Hatta had misled the Dutch Government as well as his own people.

Also at a later stage, on August 11, 1948, after Suripno, and with Suripno was communist leader Musso, had returned to Yogjakarta and convincingly proven the legitimacy of the treaty, Hatta still stubbornly rejected its ratification. One now may conclude that in the Suripno affair Hatta had given the first clear evidence that he was extremely unreliable and that the Indonesian left was right to accuse him of having silently tried to manoeuvre Indonesia into the

Imperialist camp. According to the Indonesian left Hatta had "betrayed the country's policy of neutrality by telling the Indonesian people perverse lies."

Hatta's policies were vehemently critized by the FDR leadership and Musso who had just returned to his Indonesian fatherland. In particular Musso's views drew much attention. He had lived in exile in the Soviet Union for approximately 20 years and was regarded by the left as an expert on Soviet Policies. During a meeting organized by the PKI on August 20, 1948, Musso bluntly told the audience:

> In case we had exchanged Consuls, then the Dutch blockade offshore would immediately have been dismantled. And in case Soviet warships had protected our seas, the much smaller Dutch armed vessels would not even have dared to come to our islands...it is certain that the Soviet Union will support us. And we should realize that in these days only the Soviet Union has a strong position...the Soviet Government knows very well that at the moment the United States is on the verge of a collapse, the American economy is almost in ruins.[28]

But Musso's analysis of the international power relations in 1948 was wrong. The reason why Hatta had turned to the United States was indeed America's extremely strong position in the international power game in those days. And it is certain that Hatta had made his choice in consultation with the US representatives in South-East Asia. On July 21, 1948, a secret meeting was organized at Hotel "Huize Hansje" at Sarangan, a holiday resort in the Madiun area, East Java. The meeting was attended by Gerald Hopkins (political advisor to President Truman of the United States), Merle Cochran (the new US representative in the Commission of Good Offices), Sukarno, Hatta,

Sukiman (*Masjumi's* Chairman and Minister for the Interior in the Hatta Cabinet), M. Natsir (member of *Masjumi* and Minister for Information), M. Roem (member of *Masjumi*), and Sukanto (Chief of the Indonesian Police). Attention should be paid to the absence of representatives of the PNI.[29] The Sarangan meeting has been reported by Vailland in his book *Boroboudour* (the following is an English translation):

> The position of the provisional Government in Yogja was serious...The purpose of the meeting was to acquire diplomatic and material support from the United States of America...Mr. Hatta pointed out that England was fully prepared to grant the help the Yogja Government had requested from the United States. He recalled that his country could abundantly provide the two Anglo-Saxon empires with the strategic raw materials they needed so urgently. The American reply came immediately - The United States was at once ready to give the money and would support a subsequent intervention by the United Nations which would result in the eviction of the Dutch and the independence of Indonesia. But the Americans also made two conditions: first, the Republic should break the ties with London, and secondly, it should eliminate the communist elements in the popular armed groups. (Vailland, p.157)

A few weeks prior to the Sarangan meeting, Hatta had already explained these views in the above-mentioned talk with Dutch envoy Neher. I quote from the latter's report: "Both Indonesia and the Netherlands were only weak powers. Also in case of a close co-operation they would not have the possibility to resist a really big power. Indonesia would always be dependent on outside help, in particular from the United States."

But that would not mean that a possible co-operation between Indonesia and the Netherlands would be insignificant. Hatta had in mind, among others, the help Dutch military instructors could give in modernizing the Indonesian Army, while "as an appreciation of this help" the Dutch could be allowed to keep military bases in Indonesia.

And that would even be inevitable because Indonesia had gradually fallen "in the grip of the United States"! And indeed, in those days the United States had already acquired quite big interests in the Indonesian archipelago. American private companies had started nickel and iron ore mining in Sulawesi (Celebes). The mining industries in Bangka and Belitung exported tin and zinc to the United States. Rockefeller's Standard Oil drilled approximately 500 crude oil wells in Sumatra. In the same island Goodrich and another rubber giant owned plantations of about 100,000 hectares each. Besides oil, tin, zinc and rubber, Indonesia could provide American imperialism with many more strategic raw materials.

In the middle of September 1948 Dr. D.U. Stikker, the newly appointed Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs and a member of the VVD (Liberal Party in the Netherlands) wanted to make an official visit to the United States. The then Dutch Ambassador in Washington, Dr. van Kleffens, informed Stikker on the telephone that the US Government in fact had objections against the visit although an official approval had been given. "Aside from the announcement of your visit, today Lovett informed me that Cochran (in Indonesia) has advised the State Department to strengthen Hatta's position in order to block growing communist influence, and the State Department has decided to follow Cochran's advice." From a code-cable from Stikker to Elink Schuurman dated October 6, 1948, the following should be quoted: "It has become an undeniable fact that the United States, and also Great Britain, are convinced that in East Asia the influence of communism can be curbed by making concessions with the so-called moderate elements. However, it is still correct to distrust these so-called moderate

elements and assume that they will cowardly surrender to communist influence and elements."[30] This was the cardinal point in the contradictions between the American and Dutch policies. According to American diplomats, because of their wavering attitudes the Dutch gradually became the target of attacks by all Indonesian political forces, nationalists as well as communists.[31]

More clear was the common goal: to destroy communism and to secure Indonesia's rich raw materials for the so-called "Free West". On September 17, 1948, Stikker told the press in Washington that communist expansion in Indonesia was a serious obstacle to the western powers to acquire strategic raw materials. The United States fully agreed with this statement. But it did not agree with the approach of the Dutch solving the various problems. The Americans assumed the Dutch wanted to let the world believe that the whole Indonesian nation was a "commuist bulwark". In case the Republic could be presented as a communist state, then there would be enough grounds to totally destroy it. That was why a number of Dutch politicians started to call Hatta a "crypto-communist". It was these reactionary Dutch leaders who wanted to fully restore Dutch rule in Indonesia.

But the Americans, who had just started their Cold War against the Soviet Union, wanted to include Hatta and his associates in one international anti-communist front to be established in East and South-East Asia. Functionaries of the United States Information Serivce (USIS),[32] who had been ordered to study communism in Indonesia, arrived at a conclusion which was disappointing to the Dutch. They stated that in Indonesia communism met with less resistance than in Europe because in Indonesia the Dutch were still trying to maintain

colonialism, although in a more subtle way.[33] In those days, in the US State Department two different views prevailed: the view expounded by the so-called "European Office" and that adopted by the so-called "Asiatic Office". The "European" view put the emphasis on the importance of the Netherlands for the US anti-communist defense system in Europe and the Atlantic Ocean (later on NATO), whereas the "Asiatic" view promoted the idea that the obviously anti-communist Hatta Government could become a stabilizing force in the South-East Asian theatre of power politics, or even a bulwark against the "communist threat" from North Asia. In those days the "Asiatic Office's" influence was stronger than that of the "European Office".

Because of the US$506,000,000 Marshall Aid in the Spring of 1948 - US$84,000,000 of it was reserved for the Dutch Administration in Indonesia - economically the Netherlands had become heavily dependent on the United States. It was now exposed to American political pressures. But in an interview in 1979, former Foreign Minister Stikker still held that he "had never feared a cut in the Marshall Aid".[34]

In the meantime, the American State Department had become more and more critical about the Dutch Indonesia policy. The Americans condemned the hostile attitude of many Dutch political leaders towards the Hatta Government. They also strongly denounced the Dutch blockade against the Republic as well as the Dutch threats to launch a military intervention. In particular the reactionary Commander of the Dutch Armed Forces in Indonesia, Lt.-General Spoor, incessantly reminded the Indonesians that they should "respect the cease-fire agreement" signed by both sides after the 1947 (first) Dutch colonial war against the

Republic, otherwise he would send a "second police force into the Republic's territory". On the other hand, we must say that the Americans never have put strong pressure on the Dutch. This moderate attitude of the Americans was clearly expressed in a statement by the American State Department. In that statement, the Americans still regarded co-operation with the Dutch essential. It would be, they said "to the benefit of both the Netherlands and Indonesia." They considered that the Dutch annually earned US$200-300 million from their investments in Indonesia and that the Dutch could not afford to miss these important earnings. The Americans also pointed out that it was in the interest of all free nations in the world to find a peaceful solution to the Dutch-Indonesian dispute by voluntarily making use of co-operative means. Many of the free nations were in need of oil, tin, rubber, and other commodities which Indonesia could abundantly provide them with. Also the success of the Marshall Plan was to a great extent dependent on these commondities. To them "the stability in Europe is best served by maintaining the economic potential of Holland. And the international order and fight against growing communism in South-East Asia are best served by the creation of a democratic and stable (Indonesian) government."[35]

This was America's "grand design" for the world, and the Dutch felt the misunderstood champion of the struggle against world communism:

> We feel like the little boy with the finger in the dyke (this is how, according to a Dutch story, a boy stopped a flood), who is convinced to be doing the only just thing under the circumstances, in the necessary, unfortunately generally misunderstood effort at stopping a flood of chaos and communism that threatens to overflow - especially Asia.(A Dutch official, Dr. Slotemaker de Bruine, in a Statement

to the American Press and Radio in Chicago on December 23, 1948. That was five days after the Dutch had launched their second colonial war against the Republic of Indonesia).

(vi) MUSSO'S RETURN AND THE FDR'S NEW POLICY

As briefly mentioned earlier, on August 11, 1948, Musso arrived in Indonesia, his fatherland, after an exile of approximately 20 years in Moscow. He arrived together with Suripno.[36] Sukarno officially received Musso in the presidential palace in Yogja and was told by the still militant communist leader: "I came to restore order". And Musso did not waste time.

Musso criticized the FDR leadership on several political and organizational errors. The main points of criticism were:

1. The FDR leaders had failed to pursue a consistent anti-imperialist course and consequently, the Indonesian Revolution had been pushed on the defensive;
2. The leadership of the Revolution had not fallen into the hands of the working class; and
3. The several Marxist parties - PKI, PBI, and *Partai Sosialis* - should form one single party, the PKI.

The criticism was embodied in a resolution, *Djalan baru untuk Republik Indonesia* (A new road for the Republic of Indonesia), which was adopted during a party conference of the PKI on August 26 and 27, 1948.

Musso also criticized the leadership of the Republic and Indonesian Revolution, including the two top leaders, Sukarno and Hatta. In the August 23, 1948 issue of the *Pesindo* newspaper

Revolusioner he said: "The Revolution has made errors by emphasizing negotiations and compromises...Sukarno and Hatta have done their utmost to put the blame for the Revolution's failure on others." It is possible that this unwise statement unnecessarily provoked Sukarno's dislike for Musso!

The new political line adopted during PKI's party conference of August 26 and 27, 1948, was quickly implemented by associated organizations, such as SOBSI and *Pesindo*. Important FDR leaders, among them Amir Sjarifudin, openly accepted *self-criticism*. Quite unexpectedly they "confessed" that for many years they had been members of the illegal PKI.[37] A new political bureau was established. All important FDR leaders became members of this new body, people like Maruto Darusman, Tan Ling Djie, Harjono, Setiadjit, Djokosujono, Aidit, Wikana, Suripno, Amir Sjarifudin, Alimin. Musso was the new body's chairman. Remarkably, it was exactly the majority of these people who had to be blamed for the FDR's failures. But in their "self-criticism" these people had "confessed" that they had made errors and now they were prepared to follow Musso's new line. In his notes,[38] Suripno recalls that in fact the re-appointment of these "quickly and easily re-educated" former FDR leaders, now leaders of the "new PKI", should be considered as one of the fatal mistakes made by the left before the Madiun upheaval. These re-appointments gave the enemies of the PKI sufficient grounds to launch an anti-PKI campaign.

These enemies thought the PKI had now a bright future, and they stepped up their attacks on the communists. The army leadership prepared several measures to "eliminate the communists". On

September 1, 1948, the *Murbaist* Tan Malaka group asked the Government to take firm measures against the FDR "traitors" who, according to Tan Malaka, were in fact "collaborators with the Dutch". His group had distributed false FDR pamphlets in order to provoke the Government to take "appropriate action". The provocation was partly successful. On August 17, 1948, Hatta suddenly gave orders to release from detention a big number of Tan Malaka's followers who had been involved in the attempted *coup d'état* of July 3, 1946.[39] Seemingly Hatta tried to play off the Indonesian Trotskyists against the communists.[40] On September 2, 1948, in the BP-KNIP Hatta announced that the Government would use its "iron fist" against everyone who "resorts to intimidation and anarchy". This was for the first time that Hatta had publicly attacked the communists. On September 16, 1948, Hatta again openly attacked the communists. He accused them of advocating "suicidal policies for the Republic". And, finally, Hatta said that Musso was promoting "the Republic's involvement in a Soviet-American conflict". Officially, in oral as well as written statements, Hatta pretended that he still followed a "neutral" political course, but actually he was surrendering his country to American imperialism.[41]

(vii) SOLO AND MADIUN

The events that took place during the last two weeks before September 18, 1948, the day the Madiun revolt broke out, are described in detail by D.C. Anderson in an article "The military aspects of the Madiun Affair."[42] A brief survey of the facts has been included in a white paper issued by the PKI in the beginning of the 1950's, *Buku Putih tentang Peristiwa Madiun*. To my view, the PKI's white paper gives a quite one-sided account of the revolt. A third, very important

source of information is Sumarsono's statements on November 11, 1949, and Suripno's notes written in prison in December 1948. *Pesindo* member Sumarsono was made Military Governor of Madiun by the rebels after September 18, and Suripno wrote the notes shortly before he was executed.[43]

During the weeks prior to September 18, political developments accelerated. A group of FDR/PKI leaders made an agitation and propaganda (*agitprop*) tour through Central and East Java promoting Musso's political ideas. Another group remained in Jogjakarta desparately trying to induce PNI and *Masjumi* leaders to form a new cabinet that would also include FDR/PKI representatives. In fact, the situation had become quite chaotic for the FDR/PKI. The unification of the various political forces had become a failure. It had been hoped that the unification could have been realized during a Unification Congress scheduled for October 1-3, 1948. But some PKI and *Partai Sosialis* members, for instance, in Bojonegoro in East Java, still opposed the August 26 and 27, 1948 decisions by the PKI.

Also during the weeks prior to September 18, the first skirmishes took place, between pro-Hatta elements or units of the Army on the one side and pro-FDR armed groups on the other. It turned out that the Army, supported by Tan Malaka's *Murbaist* and pro-*Masjumi* armed groups, had already started an effort to disarm so-called "leftist" military units and armed groups. Also an increasing number of "leftist" officers were cold-bloodedly murdered or kidnapped. Some of the main events:

> From the first week of September onwards, the Hatta Government dismissed a growing number of pro-PKI

officers from key positions within the regular military units.[44]

Bojonegoro's police brigade, which was placed under the command of *Partai Sosialis* leader Asmaun, was disarmed by General Police Brigade East Java. The General Police Brigade acted under orders by Hatta. But the FDR/PKI retaliated by disarming some units of General Police Brigade.[45]

On September 1, two members of Solo's PKI board, Slamet Widjaja and Pardio, were kidnapped. They were forcibly brought to the Army's base near Tasikmadu. There they were interrogated about the activities and organization of the PKI in Solo.[46]

On September 7 almost all officers and a number of lower-ranking soldiers of Commander Yadau's *Tentara Laut Republik Indonesia* (TLRI, Republican Navy) were kidnapped. They were forcibly brought to a base of *Siliwangi* Division near Srambatan.[47] Later on they were transferred to an internment camp in Yogjakarta. The camp had been set up by the Hatta Government. In other words, there is clear evidence that the *Siliwangi* Division as well as the Hatta Government were involved in murder and kidnapping!

On September 9 Suadi, Sutarto's successor as

Commander of *Senopati*, obtained the official approval by Indonesian Army commander Sudirman to organize an investigation into the murder and kidnapping of people in the Yogja and Solo region. But shortly after the investigation had started a number of officers, who were given orders to interrogate the suspects, were kidnapped, too. Major Suharman disappeared without trace, while Lt.-Colonel Sumarto was forcibly brought to the *Siliwangi* base near Srambatan. Suadi immediately asked the *Siliwangi* Division to return Sumarto to *Senopati*. Shortly before the ultimatum was going to expire, *Angkatan Laut Republik Indonesia* (ALRI, Indonesian Navy) Major Sutarno was sent to hear *Siliwangi*'s reply. However, on arrival at Srambatan the unfortunate Sutarno was killed on the spot. Immediately the Srambatan base was attacked by *Senopati* units. A ceasefire was reached after an urgent call by Army Commander Sudirman.[48]

Tan Malaka's *Murbaists* stepped up their provocative activities. In the many public meetings they organized, the FDR/PKI leaders were called "Queen Wilhelmina communists" and accused of "having sold the fatherland to Dutch colonialism". They falsified PKI documents and forged the signatures of PKI leaders in an effort to produce "*the* evidence"

> that the PKI was "preparing a coup". In the night of September 8 they attacked the Solo *Pesindo* headquarters and stole during that raid all *Pesindo* records and files. A group, probably FDR/PKI cadres, retaliated by kidnapping Tan Malaka follower Dr. Muwardi. When the PKI did not release Muwardi within a couple of days, the *Murbaists* ransacked the Solo *Pesindo* headquarters for the second time. On September 13 in Blitar, South of Malang, government units arrested a number of *Pesindo* members. On the same day in Nganjuk, east of Madiun, other government units under the command of Suhud, a fanatical supporter of Hatta's rationalization policy, organized razzias.

I can easily mention many more events which prove that the Hatta Government had already started to cut the PKI's links with armed groups and units of the Indonesian. Anderson gives a clear account of how, under heavy pressure by fervent anti-communist *Siliwangi* officers and Nasution, Indonesian Army Commander Sudirman was forced to change his earlier plans for a solution of the Solo conflict. Originally Sudirman had thought it would be best to withdraw the *Siliwangi* troops from Solo and surrounding areas and to leave the whole region to *Senopati*. But after the sharp criticism by the *Siliwangi* officers and Nasution, Sudirman abandoned the original strategy and decided to appoint the anti-communist and pro-

Siliwangi Colonel Gatot Subroto as Military Commander of Solo and surrounding areas. Gatot was known for his love of "iron" discipline which he, as a KNIL Sergeant-Major, had learned from his Dutch Colonial masters. Moreover, he had been Director of the Indonesian Military Police.

In fact, militarily the Indonesian left was already beaten before the real battle had started. The FDR/PKI's last important bulwark was now Madiun, after Yogja and Solo the third biggest city controlled by the Indonesian Republic - Batavia (Jakarta) and Surabaya had already fallen in the hands of the Dutch who had returned from exile in Australia. However, under the influence of the events in Solo both sides continued preparations for the big, decisive battle. Sumarsono reports:

> Having in mind its quite strong position in Madiun, FDR's Central Board in Yogjakarta decided to use the Madiun area as a base on which it could fall back in a critical situation. Hence, the position in Madiun should be strengthened by armed units that were prepared to defend the FDR. (November 11, 1949 statements)

Certain pro-FDR/PKI military units (in fact the last of such units) were stationed in Madiun and the areas very close to the city. These units had been placed along the demarcation line (the border between the Republican and Dutch controlled parts of Java) and had now to be moved from the demarcation line to the areas around Madiun. The FDR/PKI leadership considered the defense of Madiun as its main stronghold; for the moment more important than that of the demarcation line.

The FDR/PKI leadership gave also special instructions to complete as soon as possible the implementation of the agrarian

reforms in the Madiun area, such as a more just distribution and redistribution of land and crops. It wanted to enhance the FDR/PKI's influence and prestige in the region which was now under threat of attack by elements supporting Hatta's reactionary policies. Madiun should become an invincible bastion of the PKI.[49]

But unfortunately, for the FDR/PKI, the Madiun region had already been infiltrated by armed anti-communist groups and pro-Hatta Government Military units since the beginning of September. The anti-communist Military Police took violent measures against workers employed by the Municipality of Madiun who went on strike. The Military Police also started a witchhunt on SOBSI members.

By the middle of September 1948, the PKI had fallen back on its last big stronghold, Madiun. The possible loss of this bulwark would almost eliminate its much weaker position in other parts of the Indonesian archipelago.

> At the same time reports from both FDR's investigation department and certain police officers reached the FDR leadership. These reports convincingly demonstrated that the Military Police as well as the *Siliwangi* units (particularly *Brigade Tengkorak*) wanted the FDR troops, and other troops under FDR's "influence", to be disarmed. After disarmament the FDR leaders should be arrested...Indeed, during the days prior to the Affair there was a continuous stream of *Siliwangi* units flowing into the Madiun region. Rumors circulating among the population indicated that these troops were sent to disarm FDR units which opposed Presidential Decree No. 13 (Presidential decree ordering the reorganization and rationalization of the Indonesian Army). The local population had also experienced that during the last days before the upheaval there were many units of the Military Police and *Siliwangi* Division in the streets of Madiun, on patrol or on guard. The FDR units, confronted with the activites of the Military Police and *Siliwangi* units, were well-prepared to put up an

> extremely tenacious defense. They were even prepared to go into the offensive when it would turn out that this would be the best strategy. The situation grew more and more tense. (November 11,1949 statements).

Anderson gives the following account of the FDR/PKI's awkward position on the eve of the Madiun Affair:

> Worse still, news came that the *Siliwangi* and the *Barisan Banteng* had defeated the *Senopati* in Solo on September 17, and were preparing to march on the *Pesindo* citadel in Madiun to round off their victory. Under these circumstances, the *laskar* leaders were faced with only two possible courses of action. They could either decide to do nothing and allow the pro-government forces to destroy their military organization in Madiun and elsewhere on the pretext that it constituted a threat to internal security, or take over the republican administration in the residency...which the FDR people in the city dominated anyway...and trust that this dramatic indication of their determination to survive would be enough to halt the forward movement of the pro-government forces (1976, p.25).

Sumarsono informs us how he received orders to meet outside the city of Madiun the members of the FDR/PKI's Central Board who, at the outbreak of the revolt, were in the countryside trying to mobilize the local population. He had to ask these Central Board members for further instructions. Sumarsono and the members of the Central Board who were outside Madiun arrived at the conclusion that the FDR/PKI should disarm immediately the units of the Military Police, the State Police, and the *Siliwangi* Division before these units were given the opportunity to launch a combined frontal attack on the FDR/PKI and its many supporters. However, surprisingly the FDR/PKI had not issued instructions to occupy and take over government offices.[50]

In the very early hours of September 18, 1948, the FDR/PKI

launched its more or less planned operation to neutralize the pro-Hatta Government elements. Within a couple of hours the city of Madiun was brought under control of the PDR/PKI. There was almost no bloodshed, only a captain in the pro-Hatta units lost his life, hit by a stray bullet.[51]

Setiadjit and Wikana were in Madiun, and they decided to take over the civil administration. They installed a new local government, the *Pemerintah Front Nasional Daerah Madiun* (Government of the National Front of the Region of Madiun).[52]

The other FDR/PKI leaders were in Purwodadi, approximately 150 km north of Madiun, when, for the first time, they heard about the dramatic events in Madiun. They had listened to Sumarsono's enthusiastic speech on the radio. In the evening *Radio Gelora Pemuda* (Glorious Youth Radio) broadcast a commentary in Dutch:

> Madiun rises to destroy all enemies of the Revolution! The People have disarmed the Police, the Military Police, and the Army. The workers and peasants have formed a new government. We will continue to use our weapons until the entire territory of Indonesia has been liberated. The hour of the Revolution has come (September 20,1948).

If this commentary is correct, it demonstrates that the *local* FDR/PKI leaders had taken the initiative.

The FDR/PKI leaders who were outside the city of Madiun immediately broke off their tour in the countryside and returned to Madiun. On arrival, 20 hours after the revolt had started, they immediately held a meeting to discuss the new situation. But before they could release some statements, they were confronted with an unexpected fact: on September 19, 1948, at 8 p.m. President Sukarno

declared war against the PKI, Musso. Sukarno said, among others, "It is clear that these activities have only one aim: the overthrow of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia...yesterday evening Musso of the PKI launched a coup. In Madiun the legal authority has been overpowered and replaced by a Soviet-type of government under the leadership of Musso." The Indonesian people "should choose between Musso and his PKI, who will lead the Indonesian ideals of liberty to bankruptcy, *or* Sukarno and Hatta, who with the help of God will lead the State to an independent Indonesia, liberated from any foreign domination."

It is not clear whether Sukarno at the moment of this declaration had already been informed that during the meeting of September 19 the FDR/PKI leaders had decided to propose a compromise: the occupation of Madiun would not be extended, but on the condition that the leaders in Yogjakarta would show their willingness to include "real progressive" elements in the Government. However, the Hatta Government, who had provoked the uprising, was very happy with the splendid opportunity to destroy the Indonesian left. Hatta was convinced that in an armed confrontation with the FDR/PKI the Indonesian Army, which was loyal to the Government, would be the stronger side. Moreover, it was doubtful whether in the near future the internal power relations would be any better for the Indonesian right. In other words, Hatta could not afford to miss this opportunity, which would also give him the chance of complying with the conditions of US aid as mentioned by Cochran during the latter's visit to Sukarno and Hatta on the same day as Sukarno's declaration of war against "Musso's PKI".[53]

Musso immediately replied to Sukarno's declaration of war. Within one-and-a-half hours he delivered a very emotional counter-attack: "After these years of misrule the People are fed up with Sukarno and Hatta. First they followed a policy of capitulation to Dutch and British interests, and now they are trying to surrender the Indonesian People to American imperialism." Musso was convinced that the Indonesian People would choose his side and not that of the "traitors" and "*Romusha* dealers",[54] Sukarno and Hatta. Alers has made the following remark on Musso's reply to Sukarno's declaration of war:

> This is probably the most outrageous act of political psychology ever encountered in Indonesian history (Alers, 1956, p.190).

There is some indication that soon after Musso's vehement attack on Sukarno and Hatta, a split took place between Musso on the one side and the other FDR/PKI leaders on the other. First, Musso's attack on Sukarno and Hatta proved to be his last political performance and it was never backed up by the other FDR/PKI leaders. Secondly, the latter were much more moderate. In their public statements they even sought some sort of reconciliation. For instance, in his radio speech of September 20, 1948, Suripno said:

> Concerning Sukarno's remark that the Indonesian people should choose between Sukarno/Hatta or Musso,...the people are not obliged to choose, but only have to continue the struggle for independence (September 20,1948).

On the very same day, Djokosujono, Military Commander of Madiun after September 18, 1948, and former senior officer (Colonel) of Army Headquarters in Yogjakarta, declared:

> The Madiun Affair is no coup; it is not an attempt to overthrow the Republic...it is only an attempt to eliminate colonial and feudal elements (September 20,1948).

And Amir Sjarifudin stated:

> Our constitution is that of the Republic of Indonesia; our flag is the Red-and-White, and our national anthem is no other than *Indonesia Raya* (September 20,1948)

But the reactionary and revengeful alliance between Hatta, Nasution, and the leaders of *Masjumi* rejected the idea of a reconciliation. They were determined to destroy the Indonesian left. Even after Lt.-Colonel Suharto (presently Indonesia's Head of State), who was sent to Madiun by Sudirman to carry out investigations, had returned to Yogjakarta with clear proposals for a compromise,[55] and had reported that *the situation in Madiun was entirely different* from what the Government had told the Indonesian people on the radio, Hatta, Nasution and the *Masjumi* leadership still stubbornly refused to talk with the FDR/PKI leaders.[56] The very revengeful and malicious *Masjumi* leaders even called for a "holy war, a *jihad,* against the FDR/PKI"! "Those who are backing Musso should be crushed, and those who are siding with President Sukarno should participate in the elimination of Musso and his followers."[57]

Moorianto, who at the time of the Madiun Affair was *Resident*[58] of Madiun, has confirmed in a recent interview that "there was no such thing as a coup in Madiun. The situation in the city of Madiun did not change, it was all the time calm and normal. Nobody was arrested or killed." Unfortunately, there was one military incident which was misued by Hatta as a ground for military operations against the FDR/PKI.[59]

Above-mentioned new information about the so-called "Madiun Affair" has convinced me that there was clearly NO *coup d'état* in

Madiun in September 1948. At the most one can only speak about a *coup de la ville*, a coup against the municipality of Madiun. The FDR/PKI had never planned to overthrow the Hatta Government. Its only goal was to stop the implementation of Hatta's rationalization program as well as the offensive by the reactionary and counter-revolutionary block formed by Hatta, Nasution and the leaders of *Masjumi*. The fact that the Hatta Government did not encounter any problem when it arrested a big number of FDR/PKI leaders and followers in Yogjakarta, gives sufficient evidence that there were no plans for a *coup d'état*. The representatives of the PKI even attended the BP-KNIP session of September 20, 1948, two days after the FDR/PKI and the anti-rationalization military units and armed groups had occupied Madiun.[60] Persons involved in a coup plan would have acted differently. Particularly, they would have gone into hiding. Some time later on the Hatta Government could easily arrest thousands of so-called "leftist" politicians, labor unionits, journalists, students, etc.[61]

There is another fact which enhances the conclusion that there was no coup in Madiun. It is the undeniable fact that part of the FDR/PKI leadership was on a tour in the countryside at the time of the September 18 events while the other leaders peacefully remained in Yogjakarta at the same time. These leaders were not aware of what was going on in Madiun.

It was Hatta who gave orders for a bloody intervention. Madiun was within ten days re-occupied by government troops, particularly the *Siliwangi* Division. After a fierce resistance, the FDR/PKI leaders and their small military force had to withdraw from Madiun and continued the struggle in the countryside. Then the

Siliwangi Division organized a bloody witchhunt for FDR/PKI members, supporters and sympathizers. One by one they were arrested or killed. Musso was killed in an armed clash, he died with his rifle in his hand. Amir Sjarifudin, Maruto Darusman, Suripno, Djokosujono, and other FDR/PKI leaders were murdered in December 1948 by soldiers of Gatot Subroto. It was Hatta who had cowardly ordered Gatot to execute the prisoners without trial.

In the so-called "Madiun Affair" Indonesia lost a number of its best revolutionaries, true fighters for the interests of the poor and oppressed. In fact, the FDR/PKI had already started Indonesia's first social revolution. It had promoted agrarian reforms, it tried to eliminate feudal elements and prevent a take-over of the country by compradors of US imperialism and Dutch neo-colonialism. It was Hatta, in his eagerness to reach a compradorial compromise with US imperialism and Dutch neo-colonialism, who aborted Indonesia's first social revolution. In the bloody intervention he enjoyed the support of reactionary army leaders, particularly Colonel Nasution and senior officers of the *Siliwangi* Division. Hatta's betrayal of Indonesian socialism was a setback of the Revolution of 1945 for more than a decade.

Fortunately, some of the younger PKI cadres were able to escape Hatta's witchhunt for communists and other revolutionaries in Madiun. They became the new leaders of the PKI - D.N. Aidit, Njoto, Njono, Lukman, Sudisman, and many others. And they played an important role in Sukarno's economic decolonization and second social revolution which started in 1958 with the nationalization of all Dutch property in the country.[62] But we know now that again it was the reactionary leadership of the Indonesian Army[63] that destroyed this

second socialist revolution by cold-bloodedly murdering approximately 500,000 innocent Indonesian workers, peasants, youth, teachers, women, etc., and arresting almost 300,000 other innocent Indonesians to put them without trial in concentration camps, for instance, the camps of Buru Island, for a dozen years.[64] The consequences of the Abortive Military Coup of October 1, 1965, were much worse than the consequences of the Madiun Affair.

FOOTNOTES

1. This *Report* was based on, among others, information by Ismojo, who had been Secretary to Setiadjit Sugondo.

2. On November 13, 1947, the *Masjumi* decided to give support to the Amir Sjarifudin Cabinet and even to join the Cabinet.

3. Respectively Ali Sastroamidjojo, who was Minister of Education, and Samsuddin, the Vice-Premier.

4. Talk with Siauw Giok Tjan on April 25, 1979.

5. *Report* mentioned in Note 1, p.3.

6. According to Sumarsono in his November 11, 1949 statements, both Sukarno and Hatta had done their utmost to get Renville accepted.

7. *Report* mentioned in Note 1, pp.3-4.

8. George McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, Ithaca, N.Y.:Cornell University Press, 1952, p.232.

9. Abu Hanifah, *Tales of a Revolution*, Brisbane, University of Queensland Press, 1972, p.273.

10. *Masjumi* leader. In 1951 Sukiman, then Premier, launched a witchhunt for communists. The Sukiman Government tried to prevent the comeback of the communists in politics.

11. *Report* mentioned in Note 1, p.3.

12. Comparable with the liberation armies and armed guerrilla groups in other South-East Asian countries, for instance, the New People's Army (NPA) in the Philippines, or *Organisasi Papua Merdeka* (OPM, Organization for a Free Papua) in Irian Jaya (formerly Netherlands New Guinea) (for the second liberation movement see, among others, Ernst Utrecht, *Papoeas in Opstand*, Rotterdam: Ordeman, 1978).

13. KNIL = *Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger* (Royal Netherlands Indies Army). In 1945 an important part of the *Indonesian* KNIL military joined the armed groups in the Republic. They became the founders of the present Indonesian Army which is a regular professional army. See Ernst Utrecht, *The Indonesian Army*, Townsville:James Cook University of North Queensland, South-East Asia Monograph, 1979.

14. Arnold Brackman, *Indonesian Communism: A History*, New York: Praeger, 1963, p.80: "His immediate goals were the demobilization of regular army units suspected of having been infiltrated by the communists and the disbanding of the irregular fighting organizations of the left".

See also Ernst Utrecht, *op.cit.*

15. Among others, Ernst Utrecht, *op.cit.*

16. See concept by Nasution in *Merah Putih,* 23,1948.

17. Hatta in daily Work Committee of KNIP, February 16, 1948.

18. In *Indonesia* (issued by Cornell Modern Indonesia Project), No.21 (April 1976), pp.1-64.

19. Like Sukarno, General Sudirman adopted a "neutral" attitude in order to be able to mediate in conflicts and maintain as much as possible the Army's unity.

20. *CMI Document* No.5630 (CMI=Dutch Military Intelligence).

21. *CMI Document* No.5328.

22. For the full text of the National Program see *Wekelijkse Kroniek* (issued by *Regerings Voorlichtingdienst* (RVD, Government Information Service) in Batavia), July 22, 1948.

23. Confidential report by Indonesian State Police, PAM Department (Information), September 10, 1948.

24. This is contradictory to what has been said by Kahin - *Nationalism and Revolution,* p.268.

25. Abu Hanifah, *op.cit.* p.282. Abu Hanifah was at the time a member of *Masjumi's* Central Board.

26. Conversation with Parna in Amsterdam, April 26, 1979.

27. *Notes* on meeting between L. Neher and Hatta. The *Notes* were sent to Dr. van Mook.

28. Confidential report by Indonesian State Police (as mentioned in Note 23), p.37.

29. Remarkably the PNI did not participate in the most important meetings. Did the PNI deliberately avoid all pro-American manifestations and meetings?

30. *Code-Cable* September 15, 1948, No.509, from Dutch Foreign Office to Ambassador Elink Schuurman.

31. *Report* by Conference of American Diplomats, Bangkok, June 1948.

32. During the 1950's, the United States Information Service (USIS) gradually became one of the instruments used by the American Central Intelligence agency (CIA). However, in 1947-48 USIS was still "independent", i.e. not connected with one of the US intelligence or even espionage bodies.

33. Special information report by *Koninklijke Landmacht* (KL, Royal Netherlands Army) No.70/RB, Confidential, Buitenzorg (Bogor), March 10, 1949.

34. Conversation, April 20, 1979. Stikker died a few months after the conversation.

35. Press Agency *Aneta*, October 28, 1949.

36. According to his *Notes* written in prison at Solo, Suripno had planned to return to Indonesia in March 1948. But the return had to be delayed for several months. This part of the *Notes* was included in Marsudi, *Peristiwa Madiun*, Jakarta, 1964, pp. 77-94.

37. From 1927-45, the PKI was banned by the former Netherlands Indies administration. However, it continued its activies as the "illegal" or "underground PKI". Amir Sjarifudin "confessed" that he had been a member of the "illegal PKI" since he was a law student at the Batavia Law Faculty in the 1930's.

38. See Note 36.

39. For the July 3, 1946 attempted *coup d'état* Benedict R.O'G. Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution. Occupation and Resistance 1944-1946*, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1972, pp.370-403.

40. The morbidly anti-communist Hatta refused to reward Tan Malaka for the co-operation in the fight against FDR/PKI; on the contrary, Hatta gave orders to execute Tan Malaka. The man who carried out the execution was Colonel Gatot Subroto (a former KNIL Sergeant-Major) who also executed the arrested FDR/PKI leaders. Again it was the murderous Hatta who had ordered their execution.

41. The full texts of Hatta's perfidious speeches and other public statements are included in the booklet *Mendajung antara dua karang*, Jakarta, 1951.

42. See Note 18.

43. Sumarsono's November 11, 1949 statements as mentioned in Note 6, and Suripno's *Notes* as mentioned in Note 36.

44. Kahin, *op.cit.* p.287.

45. According to Sumarsono's November 11, 1949 statements p.2.

46. D.C. Anderson, *op.cit.* p.13. (See Note 18).

47. *Ibid.*

48. *Ibid.*

49. Sumarsono's November 11, 1949 statements, *op.cit.*

50. *Ibid.* p.5.

51. Information by Moorianto. Moorianto was at the time a member of the working committee of the umbrella *pemuda* (youth) organization *Badan Kongress Pemuda Republik Indonesia* (BKPRI, Youth Congress Organization of the Republic of Indonesia).

52. Sumarsono, *op. cit.*

53. Information by Ruth McVey, in Anderson, *op.cit.* p.27.

54. The Japanese occupation authorities needed cheap Asian labor for building the defense works for the Japanese Army in the occupied countries of South-East Asia. They forced the South-East Asian authorities placed under their control - in Indonesia, Sukarno and Hatta - to deliver the needed cheap labor (in Japanese called *romushas*). It turned out that in fact the cheap labor was *slave labor*. Tens of thousands of *romushas* starved to death, were seriously undernourished, suffered from deadly diseases, and had to perform inhumanly heavy labor. Towards the end of the war thousands of *romushas* were also killed by the heavy American bombing particularly in Burma and Thailand. Opponents of Sukarno and Hatta have accused both leaders of having surrendered more or less voluntarily their own people to the Japanese enemy. At least both leaders had inadequately resisted pressure by the Japanese to provide the Japanese war machinery with cheap laborers, *romushas*.

55. Sumarsono, *op.cit.*

56. See also *Bintang Merah,* August-September 1951.

57. *CMI Document* No. 5334 - translation into Dutch of a statement by the Board of *Masjumi* Headquarters' Defense Council, October 7, 1948.

58. An administrative rank with the status of Deputy Governor.

59. Conversation with Moorianto, April 25, 1979.

60. *Buku putih tentang peristiwa Madiun,* Jakarta, undated, p.17.

61. Conversation with Parna who belonged to the group of prisoners arrested by the Hatta Government after September 18, 1948.

62. For the nationalization of Dutch property in Indonesia in 1958 see Malcolm Caldwell and Ernst Utrecht, *Indonesia, an Alternative History,* Sydney: APCOL, 1979.

63. See Utrecht, *op.cit.*

64. *Ibid.*